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ABSTRACT
Mobile telephony equipment is daily carried by billions of
subscribers everywhere they go. Avoiding linkability of sub-
scribers by third parties, and protecting the privacy of those
subscribers is one of the goals of mobile telecommunication
protocols. We use formal methods to model and analyse the
security properties of 3G protocols. We expose two novel
threats to the user privacy in 3G telephony systems, which
make it possible to trace and identify mobile telephony sub-
scribers, and we demonstrate the feasibility of a low cost
implementation of these attacks. We propose fixes to these
privacy issues, which also take into account and solve other
privacy attacks known from the literature. We successfully
prove that our privacy-friendly fixes satisfy the desired un-
linkability and anonymity properties using the automatic
verification tool ProVerif.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
D.2.4 [Software Program Verification]: Formal Methods
General Terms
Verification, Security
Keywords
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1. INTRODUCTION
While most mobile phone users accept that the network
operator can track their geographical movements, few would
be happy if an arbitrary third party could do so. Such a
possibility would enable all kinds of undesirable behaviour,
ranging from criminal stalking and harassment to more mun-
dane monitoring of spouse or employee movements, as well
as profiling for commercial and advertisement purposes. For
this reason, 3G (Third Generation) mobile phone proto-
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cols have been designed to prevent third parties, eavesdrop-
ping on the radio link, from identifying wireless messages as
coming from a particular mobile phone. Therefore, mobile
phones identify themselves, whenever possible, by means of
temporary identifiers (TMSIs) instead of using their long
term unique identities (IMSIs). Temporary identities are
periodically updated by the network. To avoid linkability,
the assignment of a new temporary identity is encrypted us-
ing a session key established through the 3G Authentication
and Key Agreement (AKA) protocol.
When 3G protocols were first introduced in 1999, ac-
tive attack scenarios were a remote possibility because of
the high cost of the equipment required, the closedness of
the hardware design and the lack of open source imple-
mentations of the protocol stack. This scenario has re-
cently changed. Cheap base stations [19] can be produced by
programming USRP (Universal Software Radio Peripheral)
boards [21]. These lower the cost of producing radio devices
thanks to software emulation of specialized functions once
executed by expensive hardware. The increasing popular-
ity of USRPs led for example to a cheap implementation of
fake base station attacks on GSM (Global System for Mo-
bile Communication) [31], which were considered sufficiently
costly to prevent wide-scale attacks. Shorter range base sta-
tions, available at affordable prices, have been targeted as
well by open source developers (e.g. openBSC project [33]),
security researchers [23]. Certain old mobile phones based on
the Ti Calypso GSM baseband chips, can be reprogrammed
by flashing an open source version of the protocol stack (de-
veloped by the osmocom-BB project [34]). These new devel-
opments open at the same time the way for the exploration
of new uses of mobile telephony technology [1, 30] and for
the exploitation of its weaknesses [20, 23, 31, 29], making
active attack scenarios an increasingly likely reality.
Hence, we believe active attackers should now be consid-
ered when analysing mobile systems in order to obtain con-
vincing and reliable results on their security. From this per-
spective we present a formal analysis of the 3G subscribers
privacy. We expose two novel threats and we demonstrate
that these threats can lead to real implementations which
make use of cheap equipment. Furthermore, we propose pri-
vacy friendly fixes to thwart the detected privacy issues and
we formally verify that our fixes achieve the desired privacy
goals.
Our Contributions. Linkability of transactions has been
identified and often reported by the media as an impor-
tant threat for user privacy [14, 17, 24] though it has been
overlooked so far by most of the existing studies of mobile
telecommunication protocols which instead focus on confi-
dentiality and authentication requirements (Section 2.2). In
this paper, we present the first formal analysis of 3G proto-
cols w.r.t. privacy of mobile phone users from third party at-
tackers and in particular w.r.t. unlinkability and anonymity
of 3G subscribers. For our analysis we use automated formal
methods. The use of formal methods allows us to: (i) pre-
cisely and unambiguously define the desired privacy prop-
erties in terms of third-party strong anonymity and strong
unlinkability; (ii) identify new vulnerabilities with respect
to subscriber privacy thanks to a rigorous specification of
the protocols and of the analysed properties.
However, the currently available automated tools are still
quite limited and cannot straightforwardly be used to ver-
ify unlinkability and anonymity properties [11]. Here we de-
velop ways to model the protocols and the desired properties
as biprocesses in order to use the ProVerif tool on our 3G
case study. The automatic verification with the ProVerif
tool allows us to: (i) verify strong unlinkability and strong
anonymity. To the best of our knowledge, it is the first
time these definitions of privacy properties have been suc-
cessfully used for verification using an automated tool; (ii)
verify that the fixes we propose do preserve the privacy of
the mobile phone users from third parties in terms of un-
linkability and anonymity; (iii) automatically verify privacy
properties expressed as equivalence relations between sys-
tems consisting of an unbounded number of agents execut-
ing an unbounded number of sessions;(iv) obtain a higher
level of confidence in the resulting proofs than the ones pro-
vided by more error-prone manual techniques. With our
method ProVerif successfully detects the privacy vulnera-
bilities (described in Section 3) and also successfully proves
that the fixed protocols (presented in Section 5) satisfy both
unlinkability and anonymity (Section 6).
Moreover, we demonstrate how these vulnerabilities can
lead to practical attacks, by implementing them in real 3G
networks in Germany (Vodafone, O2, T-Mobile) and in France
(SFR) (Section 4).
2. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK
Third Generation telecommunications systems (3G) is a
mobile telephony standard specified and maintained by the
Third Generation Partnership Project (3GPP). It was in-
troduced in 1999, with the birth of UMTS, to offer better
support for mobile data applications, increased data rates
and to lower costs of mobile data communications. Fur-
thermore, 3G offers an improved security architecture with
respect to previous mobile telecommunication systems such
as GSM (Global System for Mobile Communication).
2.1 3G Security Requirements
3G aims to provide authentication, confidentiality of data
and voice communication, as well as user privacy [6]. In par-
ticular, 3G privacy goals include the following [6]:
User identity confidentiality: the property that the per-
manent user identity (IMSI) of a user to whom a service is
delivered cannot be eavesdropped on the radio access link;
User untraceability: the property that an intruder can-
not deduce whether different services are delivered to the
same user by eavesdropping on the radio access link.
In order to achieve these two privacy-related properties,
3G (and GSM) relies on the use of temporary identities TM-
SIs (Temporary Mobile Subscriber Identities) for identifying
and paging mobile phones (more precisely mobile stations,
MSs) instead of using their long-term identities IMSIs (In-
ternational Mobile Subscriber Identities). Indeed, the eaves-
dropping of the IMSI in plaintext communications would
allow the identification of mobile telephony users by third
parties. Moreover, the 3G standard requires periodic up-
dates of the temporary identity, to avoid the traceability of
a mobile station by third parties. New temporary identi-
ties are periodically assigned by the network through the
TMSI reallocation procedure. The newly assigned TMSI is
encrypted using a session key which is established by exe-
cuting the 3G Authentication and Key Agreement protocol
(AKA). The 3G AKA protocol allows MS and network to
achieve mutual authentication and establish a pair of shared
session keys, namely a ciphering key and an integrity key.
These keys are used to ensure the secrecy and integrity of
the subsequent communications.
2.2 Related Work
Known 3G Vulnerabilities. Three categories of attacks
on mobile telephony systems have been described in the past.
IMSI Catcher. The identification procedure, consisting
in the request of the user identity by the network followed
by a cleartext reply containing the user identity, is acknowl-
edged in the 3G standard as a breach of the user identity
confidentiality [6, p. 19, s. 6.2]. This procedure is exploited
by the well-known “IMSI catcher” attack, which is the best
known attack to mobile telephony users’ privacy. It consists
in forcing a mobile phone to reveal its identity (IMSI) [22, 32]
by triggering the identification procedure from a fake oper-
ator base station (configured with the corresponding mobile
network and country code settings). Until fairly recently,
implementing an IMSI catcher required specialised software
and equipment such as base stations. However, such devices
have become more and more affordable thanks to software
emulation [31]. To the best of our knowledge the only imple-
mentation of a 3G IMSI catcher is the one presented in [23]
and is realised using a modified femtocell.
3G/GSM-interoperability. Previously proposed attacks
on 3G security exploit the vulnerabilities which are propa-
gated from GSM to 3G when providing interoperability be-
tween the two systems. Most of the reported attacks of this
kind take advantage of well-known weaknesses of the GSM
authentication and key agreement protocol, such as the lack
of mutual authentication and the use of weak encryption.
These attacks allow an active attacker to violate the user
identity confidentiality, to eavesdrop on outbound commu-
nications [28] and to masquerade as a legitimate subscriber
obtaining services which will be billed on the victim’s ac-
count [10]. However, these attacks cannot be carried out
on pure 3G networks, which are the scope of our analysis,
because they rely on the lack of mutual authentication in
GSM and on the possibility of downgrading the communi-
cation from 3G to GSM.
3G specific. To the best of our knowledge, the only at-
tack that does not rely on GSM/3G interoperability has been
presented by Zhang and Fang in [36]. This attack is a vari-
ant of the false base station attack and takes advantage of
the fact that the mobile station does not authenticate the
serving network. It allows the redirection of the victim’s
outgoing traffic to a different network, for example a net-
work which uses a weaker encryption algorithm or one which
charges higher rates than the victim’s one. Zhang and Fang’s
attack concerns impersonation, service theft and data con-
fidentiality, while our work exhibits privacy issues arising in
3G.
Our work is based on the formal analysis of pure 3G proto-
cols. It relies on the study and modelling of the 3G standard
and does not make assumptions about interoperability be-
tween GSM and 3G. We focus on subscriber privacy and
discover further breaches other than the ones caused by the
identification procedure and the propagation of GSM weak-
nesses to 3G.
Previous Formal Analysis The 3G AKA protocol in its
pure form (i.e. with no GSM support) has been formally
proved to meet some of the specified security requirements [3],
such as authentication and confidentiality of data and voice
communication. However, privacy related properties such
as unlinkability and anonymity, which are the focus of our
work, are not analysed in [3]. The framework applied in [3]
cannot be used to specify unlinkability and anonymity prop-
erties, let alone reason about them. The formal framework
used in our paper allows us to precisely define and verify pri-
vacy related properties. Hence, we can discover privacy at-
tacks on the modelled protocols and propose solutions which
are formally proved to satisfy the desired privacy properties.
Other Work on 3G Privacy Enhancement A new frame-
work for authentication has been proposed to provide sub-
scriber privacy with respect to the network [26]. In particu-
lar, the authors aim to achieve MSs anonymity with respect
to the serving network, and location privacy with respect to
the home network. To achieve this purpose, they propose
a new mechanism for the location update and a three way
handshake protocol, to be used for authentication instead of
the currently used 3G AKA protocol. However, unlike our
work, this work is not supported by a formal model of the
AKA protocol, nor does it provide a formal verification of
the properties of the proposed protocols. Moreover, their
attacker model considers the network as not fully trusted,
while we are only concerned about third party attackers con-
trolling the radio link communications.
3. NOVEL PRIVACY THREATS
In this section we describe two breaches of privacy, which
expose a subscriber’s identity and allow an attacker capable
of sending and receiving messages on the air to identify the
presence of a target mobile phone (MS) in a monitored area,
or even track its movements across a set of monitored ar-
eas. As we will see, the attacker does not need to know any
keys, nor perform any cryptographic operation. This kind of
vulnerabilities usually look trivial once uncovered but often
remain unnoticed for long time, since they do not involve
fancy cryptography but are caused by errors in the protocol
logic.
As argued in Section 1 and as witnessed by the attacks
implementation presented in Section 4, a convincing analysis
of 3G privacy and security should consider active attackers
instead of passive ones. For this reason, we assume that the
attacker has unlimited access to the radio link between the
mobile station and the base station. He can sniff, inject,
replay, and modify messages. This attacker model is the
MS
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Figure 1: 3G IMSI Paging Procedure
same considered in most of the previous work on GSM/3G
security [28, 10, 36].
In the rest of this paper, we consider a simplified network
architecture. This architecture involves simply the mobile
stations and the network. The network models both the
Base Station (BS) which directly communicates with the MS
on the radio link, and the complex structure of databases
and servers connected with it and forming the 3G control
network. Hence, we abstract away from any communication
within the network and model only communication between
mobile stations and the network. This abstraction allows us
to hide details which are uninteresting for the purposes of
our analysis and keep the models used for verification small,
but at the same time precisely specify the interactions on
the air between MS and network, which are the subject of
our analysis.
3.1 IMSI Paging Attack
The paging procedure is used to locate a mobile station
in order to deliver a service to it, for example an incom-
ing call. Paging request messages are sent by the network
in all the location areas most recently visited by the mo-
bile station in order to locate it and deliver a service to it.
The paging request message is sent on a Common Control
Channel (CCCH) and contains the identity of one or more
mobile stations. The paging procedure is typically run using
the TMSI to identify a MS. However, the IMSI can be used
when the TMSI is not known by the network. A mobile
station receiving a paging request establishes a dedicated
channel to allow the delivery of the service and sends a pag-
ing response containing the most recently assigned TMSI
(see Figure 1).
The possibility of triggering a paging request for a spe-
cific IMSI allows an attacker to check a specific area for the
presence of mobile stations of whom he knows the identity,
and to correlate their IMSI and TMSI. As we will detail in
Section 4.2, in a real setting, the link between the paged
IMSI and the related TMSI would need to be confirmed by
replaying the attack several times.
3.2 AKA Protocol Linkability Attack
The Authentication and Key Agreement (AKA) proto-
col achieves mutual authentication between a MS and the
network, and establishes shared session keys to be used to se-
cure the subsequent communications. The MS with identity
IMSI and the network share a secret long-term key, KIMSI ,
assigned to the subscriber by the mobile operator and stored
in the USIM. The secret key allows the MS and the network
to compute shared ciphering and integrity session keys to be
used for encryption and integrity check of communications.
The 3G AKA protocol [6], shown in Figure 2, consists
in the exchange of two messages: the authentication request
and the authentication response. Before sending an authen-
MS
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new RAND
AK ← f5KIMSI (RAND)
MAC ← f1KIMSI (SQNN ||RAND)
AUTN ← (SQNN ⊕ AK)||MAC
Auth Req, RAND , AUTN
AK ← f5KIMSI (RAND)
XMSG||XMAC ← AUTN
XSQN ← XMSG ⊕ AK
MAC ← f1KIMSI (XSQN ||RAND)
if MAC 6= XMAC
then RES ← Mac Fail
elseif XSQN < SQNMS
then RES ← Sync Fail
else RES ← f2KIMSI (RAND)
Auth Resp, RES
CK ← f3KIMSI (RAND)
IK ← f4KIMSI (RAND)
if RES = f2KIMSI (RAND)
then CK ← f3KIMSI (RAND)
IK ← f4KIMSI (RAND)
else if RES 6= f2KIMSI (RAND)
then Recover
Figure 2: 3G Authentication and Key Agreement
tication request to the mobile station, the network computes
the authentication data: a fresh random challenge RAND ,
the authentication token AUTN , the expected authentica-
tion response f2K(RAND), the integrity key IK, and the en-
cryption key CK (see Figure 2). The functions f1, f2, f3, f4
and f5, used to compute the authentication parameters, are
keyed cryptographic functions computed using the shared
key KIMSI [8]. The authentication function f1 is used to
calculate the message authentication code MAC ; f2 is used
to produce the authentication response parameter RES ; the
key generation functions, f3, f4 and f5 are used to gener-
ate the ciphering key CK, the integrity key IK and the
anonymity key AK, respectively.
The network always initiates the protocol by sending the
authentication challenge RAND and the authentication to-
ken AUTN to the mobile station. AUTN contains a MAC
of the concatenation of the random number with a sequence
number SQN N generated by the network using an individ-
ual counter for each subscriber. A new sequence number
is generated either by increment of the counter or through
time based algorithms as defined in [6]. The sequence num-
ber SQN N allows the mobile station to verify the freshness
of the authentication request to defend against replay at-
tacks (see Figure 2).
The MS receives the authentication request, retrieves the
sequence number SQN N and then verifies the MAC (condi-
tion MAC = XMAC in Figure 2). This step ensures that
the MAC was generated by the network using the shared
key KIMSI , and thus that the authentication request was
intended for the mobile station with identity IMSI . The
mobile station stores the greatest sequence number used
for authentication, so far SQN MS . This value is used to
check the freshness of the authentication request (condition
XSQN < SQN MS in Figure 2).
The mobile station computes the ciphering key CK , the
integrity key IK and the authentication response RES and
MS
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Attacker Network
KIMSI , IMSI ,SQNN
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Auth Resp, RES ′
if RES ′ = Sync Fail
then MSv Found
Figure 3: AKA Protocol Linkability Attack
sends this response to the network.The network authenti-
cates the mobile station by verifying whether the received
response is equal to the expected one (RES = f2K(RAND)).
The authentication procedure can fail on the MS side either
because the MAC verification failed, or because the received
sequence number XSQN , is not in the correct range with
respect to the sequence number SQN MS stored in the mo-
bile station. In the former case, the mobile station sends
an authentication failure message indicating MAC failure
(Mac Fail) as the failure cause. In the latter case, the au-
thentication failure message indicates synchronisation fail-
ure (Sync Fail) as the failure cause. When a MAC failure
occurs the network may initiate the identification procedure.
When a synchronisation failure occurs the network performs
re-synchronisation.
To detect the presence of a victim mobile station MSv, in
one of his monitored areas, an active attacker just needs to
have previously intercepted one legitimate authentication re-
quest message containing the pair (RAND ,AUTN ) sent by
the network to MSv. The captured authentication request
can now be replayed by the adversary each time he wants
to check the presence of MSv in a particular area. In fact,
thanks to the error messages, the adversary can distinguish
any mobile station from the one the authentication request
was originally sent to. On reception of the replayed authenti-
cation challenge and authentication token (RAND ,AUTN ),
the victim mobile station MSv successfully verifies the MAC
and sends a synchronisation failure message. However, the
MAC verification fails when executed by any other mobile
station, and as a result a MAC failure message is sent. The
implementation of few false BS would then allow an attacker
to trace the movements of a victim mobile station, resulting
in a breach of the subscriber’s untraceability. The proposed
attack is shown in Figure 3.
3.3 Formal Verification
While the paging procedure is obviously a breach of
users’ privacy, the traceability attack on the AKA protocol is
much more subtle. Indeed, the messages exchanged through
this procedure contain neither the IMSI nor the TMSI of
the MS. So one could think that the AKA protocol provides
untraceability by construction. But we just saw that this is
not the case. Only careful analysis w.r.t. precisely defined
privacy requirements could reveal this flaw.
We run the ProVerif tool on the IMSI paging procedure
and on the AKA protocol 1. Details of how unlinkability
and anonymity were defined using the ProVerif calculus are
given in Section 6. ProVerif fails to prove the unlinkability
and anonymity of the IMSI paging procedure and exhibits
actual attack traces. In the case of the AKA protocol, the
anonymity property is proved to hold, while the unlinkabil-
ity property verification fails. Although, the trace provided
by ProVerif is a false attack, it does give a hint of the real
attack by highlighting the test of the MAC received from
the network as the source of the problem. The adoption of
formal verification tools during protocol design could have
thus revealed design flaws.
4. THE ATTACKS IN PRACTICE
In order to test the attacks presented in Section 3 in
a deployed telecommunication network, we use a commer-
cially available femtocell. Although, the particular femtocell
hardware is tied to the network operator SFR, the proposed
attacks are not. Indeed, we tested the attacks using mobile
phones registered to different operators, hence just using
SFR as serving network. The authentication token AUTN
is still provided by the victim’s Home network. So by test-
ing our attacks on T-Mobile, O2, SFR, and Vodafone victim
MSs, we establish that all these tested networks are vulner-
able to the attacks described above. However, we want to
stress here that our implementation has the only purpose of
showing the feasibility of our attacks and confirm that real
cellular networks follow the 3GPP standard specifications
and thus are vulnerable to the proposed attacks. The same
attacks could be mounted by appropriately programming a
USRP [21], which is a hardware device able to emit and
receive radio signals. In this case, one could obtain wider
range attack devices in order to monitor larger areas.
4.1 Femtocell architecture
A femtocell is a device that acts as a small base station
to enhance 3G coverage and connectivity, especially inside
buildings with otherwise bad coverage. Its coverage radius
ranges from 10 to 50 meters. It connects mobile phones to
the network of the corresponding MNO (Mobile Network
Operator) using an existing wired Internet connection pro-
vided by the femtocell user, not the operator. 3G femto-
cells, also called Home Node B (HNB) support most of the
functionalities provided by a typical 3G base station (Node
B), e.g. physical layer (radio signalling) functions. In ad-
dition, the HNB establishes an authenticated secure tunnel
over the Internet with the network of the operator. Using
this encrypted connection, the femtocell forwards all radio
signalling and user-generated traffic to the GANC (GAN
Controller), which is connected to the core network of the
operator (refer to [7] for more details of the femtocell archi-
tecture).
The communication between the femtocell and the GANC
is based on the Generic Access Network (GAN) protocol.
The GAN protocol, was originally designed to allow mobile
communication over Wi-Fi access points. The protocol was
standardised by MNOs in 2004 [25] and led to the GAN spec-
ification [4, 5] in 2005. This specification has been adopted
and extended to be used in femtocell environments [35] .
The femtocell uses this protocol to forward communication
from a mobile station via the GANC to the network or vice
1The ProVerif code is available online [2]
Figure 4: Experimental Attack Setup
versa. The MS does not need any special GAN support, it
just connects to the femtocell in the same way as it connects
to a standard base station. The femtocell maps all Layer-3
radio signalling to TCP/IP based GAN messages and passes
them to the GANC. Thus, it transparently encapsulates all
traffic generated by the phone and the network.
4.2 Attack Procedure
For the purpose of implementing our attacks (Section 3),
we use a compromised femtocell like the one described in [23].
More specifically, we reproduce the hacking performed in [23]
to gain root access of our femtocell and redirect the traffic
to a Man in the Middle (MitM) GAN proxy, positioned be-
tween the femtocell and the GANC. We use this MitM GAN
proxy as entry point for message injection. In particular, us-
ing the MitM GAN proxy we can inject messages into the
connection between the MNO and the femtocell. The fem-
tocell forwards these messages to the mobile phone, mak-
ing them appear as if legitimately delivered by the MNO.
To perform the attacks, we intercept, modify and inject
3G Layer-3 messages into the communication from the base
station to the mobile phone in both directions, GANC-to-
femtocell and femtocell-to-GANC. We redirect all the traffic
between the femtocell and the GANC to our GAN proxy.
The GAN traffic is cleartext travelling over an IP Sec tun-
nel for which we own the key material, thanks to the initial
rooting/hacking of the femtocell. Additionally, we devel-
oped a set of applications which allow us to intercept, ma-
nipulate or insert selected messages, and distinguish differ-
ent types of GAN messages. This allows us, for example, to
cache subscribers information used to perform the attacks.
In particular, we store the random challenge RAND , the au-
thentication token AUTN , the TMSI and the IMSI of our
victim MS. This information is directly extracted from the
traffic that is passed through the MitM GAN proxy.
IMSI-Paging Procedure Attack To perform the IMSI
paging attack, our software crafts a paging message encod-
ing the necessary paging headers and parameters and a mo-
bile station identity, i.e. one of the previously stored victim
IMSIs. The crafted paging request is then sent by the GAN
proxy to the femtocell. When the victim mobile phone re-
ceives the IMSI paging request, it readily answers with a
paging response containing the victim’s TMSI. Thus, by in-
jecting a paging request, we can check whether a phone be-
longing to a designated victim is in the area covered by our
device. In case of success, the phone generates the paging
response, while a failed attempt generates no message. In
general, it is possible that more than one phone replies to
a paging request during the same time slot. However, one
can repeat this procedure multiple times and correlate the
timing and TMSI usage from the multiple replies as in [20].
Figure 5: Successful Linkability-Attack
AKA Protocol attack To perform the AKA attack we re-
play a given authentication message for a specific target for
which the GAN proxy cached the legitimate authentication
data, i.e. RAND , AUTN . This data is sent unencrypted
on the radio link and could be captured with any equip-
ment capable of sniffing the radio link. As soon as a dedi-
cated channel is allocated to the MS, e.g. after being paged
or when initiating a phone call, our software crafts an au-
thentication request Auth Req using the previously cached
RAND and AUTN , i.e. replays a previous request. This
request is encapsulated into a GAN message and sent to the
femtocell. The femtocell takes care of delivering the authen-
tication request message on the dedicated channel assigned
to the MS, as illustrated in Figure 4. The phone performs
a validation of the authentication request and answers with
the authentication response. If the response to the replayed
authentication is a Synchronisation Failure (Figure 5), then
the MS on this dedicated channel is the victim’s phone, and
the victim is indeed in the femtocell area. Otherwise, the
attacker needs to inject the same message to the other mo-
bile stations in his area in order to find out if the victim MS
is present or not.
The 3G AKA protocol is performed at each new session
in the femtocell setting, this makes the caching of the au-
thentication parameters very easy. Though, we do not have
the tools to test if this applies when connecting to a typical
Node B, we tested the 3G/GSM interoperability scenario
by using the Osmocom-BB software and we observed that
in this setting the execution of the AKA protocol can be
triggered by calling for example the victim mobile phone a
given number of times (by hanging up within a short time
window this activity can be made non detectable by the vic-
tim [20]). For instance, our experiments showed that the
execution of the AKA protocol on the UK Vodafone net-
work can be triggered by calling six times the victim mobile
phone, and hanging up before it even rings.
To illustrate the use of our attacks, consider an employer
interested in tracking one of his employee’s accesses to a
building. He would first use the femtocell to sniff a valid au-
thentication request. This could happen in a different area
than the monitored one. Then the employer would position
the device near the entrance of the building. Movements
inside the building could be tracked as well by placing addi-
tional devices to cover different areas of the building. Sim-
ilarly, these attacks could be used to collect large amount
of data on users’ movements in defined areas for profiling
purposes, as an example of how mobile systems have al-
ready been exploited in this direction is available in [1] If
devices with wider area coverage than a femtocell are used,
the adversary should use triangulation to obtain finer posi-
tion data.
5. PRIVACY PRESERVING FIXES
Despite the use of temporary identities to avoid link-
ability and to ensure anonymity of 3G subscribers, active
attackers can rely on the paging procedure to break both
anonymity and unlinkability. Moreover, the AKA protocol
provides a way to trace 3G subscribers without the need
to identify them in any way. As described in the previous
section, these two attacks on privacy can be implemented
using cheap devices which are widely available. This shows
that the analysed procedures are a real threat for the users’
privacy, and countermeasures should be promptly taken to
provide an effectively privacy friendly mobile telephony sys-
tem.
In this section we propose a set of countermeasures in-
volving symmetric and public key-based cryptography. The
public key infrastructure we propose is lightweight and easy
to deploy because we only require one public/private key
pair per mobile network operator, and none for the mo-
bile stations. More generally, the solutions we present re-
quire only small changes to the current security architecture
and to the cryptographic functions currently used in 3G.
Hence we believe our solutions may be implemented in a
cost-effective way, and thus could realistically be adopted
by the telecommunication operators.
In addition to the solutions proposed to fix the IMSI
paging and the AKA protocol, in this section we give a pri-
vacy friendly version of the identification procedure to fix
the IMSI catcher attack. Indeed, the problem of privacy is
a multilayer/multiprotocol problem [13] which requires all
protocols at all layers to satisfy the desired properties. Even
though, the analysis from the user privacy point of view of
the entire set of 3G protocols cannot be tackled in a single
MS
KIMSI , IMSI , SQNMS
Network
KIMSI , IMSI , SQNN
new chall, rand
UK ← fKIMSI (rand)
IMSI Pag Req, rand,
{Page, IMSI , chall , SQNN}UK
UK ← fKIMSI (rand)
if SQNMS < SQNN
then RES ← IMSI PAG RES, chall
else Discard
IMSI Pag Res, chall
Figure 6: Paging Procedure Fix. The paging request is en-
crypted with the unlinkability key UK.
paper, we cannot ignore the best known privacy issue of mo-
bile telecommunication systems. For this reason, we include
a fixed version of the identification procedure in our privacy
friendly solutions.
5.1 Lightweight Public Key Infrastructure
We propose the adoption of a lightweight public key in-
frastructure (PKI) providing each MNO with a private/public
key pair. The public key of a network provider can be stored
in the USIM. This public key makes it possible for a mo-
bile station to encrypt privacy related information such as
the IMSI, and deliver them to the network in a confiden-
tial manner. We do not require a public/private key pair
to be assigned to the mobile stations. The adoption of such
a lightweight PKI can also solve the problem exposed by
Zhang and Fang in [36] concerning the lack of serving net-
work authentication in the current infrastructure.
5.2 Protecting the IMSI Paging Procedure
To protect the paging procedure, we propose to encrypt
the paging request using a shared session key UK, which
we call unlinkability key. This key is generated by apply-
ing a new one-way keyed function f to the long-term key
KIMSI , and a random number rand contained in the paging
request. This key should be used for privacy preserving pur-
poses only. Furthermore, we require the encrypted request
message to include a random challenge chall and a sequence
number SQN . The network stores the random challenge
and checks it against the one sent by the MS in the paging
response (Figure 6). The aim of the SQN is to ensure fresh-
ness of the paging request and avoid replay attacks. The
SQN should be handled in the same way as in the AKA
protocol. A MS receiving a legitimate IMSI paging request
should discard it if the SQN is not in the correct range.
The use of this procedure should still be kept minimal (pre-
ferring the paging with TMSI whenever possible) to avoid
burdening the signalling communication with cryptographic
operations. In fact, each MS has to decrypt and check all
the received IMSI paging to determine if it is the recipient.
5.3 Fixing the AKA Protocol
The AKA protocol is a threat for the unlinkability of
3G subscribers because the error messages sent in case of
authentication failure leak information about the identity of
MS
KIMSI , IMSI, SQNMS , pbN
Network
KIMSI , IMSI, SQNN , pvN
new RAND
AK ← f5KIMSI (RAND)
MAC ← f1KIMSI (SQNN ||RAND)
AUTN ← (SQNN ⊕ AK)||MAC
Auth Req, RAND, AUTN
AK ← f5KIMSI (RAND)
XMSG||XMAC ← AUTN
XSQN ← XMSG ⊕ AK
MAC ← f1KIMSI (XSQN ||RAND)
if MAC 6= XMAC or XSQN < SQNMS
then new rand
UK ← fKIMSI (rand)
RES ← Auth Fail,
{Fail, IMSI, rand, {synch, SQNMS}
r′
UK}
r
pbN
else RES ← f2KIMSI (RAND)
Auth Resp, RES
CK ← f3KIMSI (RAND)
IK ← f4KIMSI (RAND)
if RES = f2KIMSI (RAND)
then CK ← f3KIMSI (RAND)
IK ← f4KIMSI (RAND)
else if RES = Auth Fail, x
then Recover
Figure 7: The fixed AKA protocol. The error messages are
encrypted using the network public key.
the subscriber. To avoid this information leakage, the error
messages sent in case of any type of failure should look in-
distinguishable from an attacker’s point of view.
Moreover, the 3G standard stipulates [6] different proce-
dures to recover from each of the two kinds of failure, but this
is a source of additional information flow that can be used
to launch our privacy attack. In the solution we propose
we solve this problem since error recovery can be performed
within the network without the need to trigger further pro-
cedures on the air. Indeed, all the parameters needed for
error recovery are sent in the error message allowing the re-
covery procedure to be carried within the network.
The fixed version of the AKA protocol (Figure 7) carries
on as specified by the standard, the network sends RAND ,
AUTN and waits for a response. The response is RES =
f2KIMSI (RAND), as in the standard, in case the checks of
MAC and sequence number are successful. If either of these
checks fails, an error message is sent to the network. The
failure message is now encrypted with the public key of the
network pbN , and contains a constant Fail, the IMSI, and
the current sequence number SQN MS of the MS. The IMSI
sent encrypted in the error message allows the network to
check the identity of the MS without triggering the iden-
tification procedure. The current sequence number of the
mobile station enables the network to perform resynchroni-
sation with the Authentication Centre (AuC, the server stor-
ing subscribers authentication data) of the operator of the
mobile station, if needed. SQN MS is sent encrypted with the
unlinkability key (as defined in the fixed paging procedure)
in order to authenticate the error message to the Network
as coming from the MS with permanent identity IMSI . The
Network can deduce the cause of the failure from the IMSI
and SQNMS contained in the error message. Upon receipt of
MS
KIMSI , IMSI , pbN
Network
KIMSI , IMSI , pvN
Id Req, IMSI Req
Id Resp, {IMSI}r
pbN
Figure 8: Identification Procedure Fix. The identity response
is encrypted with the public key of the network. The r denotes
randomised encryption.
this authentication failure message the action performed for
error recovery purposes should be the same regardless of the
type of failure occurred. Indeed any difference in behaviour
would be a source of additional information flows.
5.4 Protecting the Identification Procedure
The identification procedure exposes the IMSI of a MS
(the IMSI is sent in cleartext upon request by the network).
Hence, it breaches both anonymity and unlinkability. Ac-
cording to the standard, the use of the identification pro-
cedure should be limited as much as possible, to avoid a
passive attacker overhearing the IMSI. However, the cost of
devices allowing active attacks is constantly decreasing. As
a consequence, enhancing the protocol to protect the IMSI
is vital to ensure privacy.
The fixed version of the identification procedure (Fig-
ure 8) involves two messages: the first is sent by the network
to ask for the IMSI, the second, the identity response, is the
randomised encryption of the IMSI of the mobile station us-
ing the public counterpart (pbN ) of the private key of the
network operator (pvN ).
5.5 Discussion of the Proposed Fixes
While the fix we propose for the identification procedure
is intuitive and straightforward, this is not the case for the
other two procedures. In particular, we take care of main-
taining the style of mobile telecommunication protocols and
at the same time ensuring privacy. We introduce the un-
linkability key, a new session key generated for privacy pur-
poses, instead of using the long term key KIMSI (as in the
3G AKA), and make use of the sequence number SQN for
freshness purposes (this is needed to avoid user linkability
caused by replay attacks); We maintain the authentication
flow of the AKA and modify only the way error messages are
dealt with by including error recovery information inside the
error message (this avoids the triggering by the network of
diversified procedures in order to perform error recovery).
Our proposed fixes use public-key cryptography; intu-
itively, there is no way to avoid that, since if a mobile sta-
tion’s TMSI is unknown to the serving network (hence the
need to perform the identification procedure) then there is
no shared key by which they can communicate privately.
The additional costs associated with deploying and using
public-key cryptography are in fact small for the two follow-
ing reasons.
Firstly, only mobile telephony operators are required to
have a public/private key pair. Neither subscribers, nor mo-
bile phone equipments nor USIMs need to have their own
public/private key pair. The operator’s public key could be
stored in the USIM of the mobile station, as it is already
the case for the IMSI and the long-term key KIMSI . The
Home Network can act as a certifying authority for the pub-
lic key of the different Serving Networks (see below). Thus,
the public key infrastructure is similar to that used on the
web, where corporations (not users) have certified keys.
Secondly, the computationally expensive public-key en-
cryption and decryption are required only for the identifi-
cation protocol and when the AKA-protocol fails. The exe-
cution of the identification and the IMSI paging procedures
should anyway be kept minimal according to the currently
deployed standard. Moreover, failures during the execution
of the AKA-protocol rarely occur according to our experi-
ments. Hence, the computational overhead of the public-key
cryptography is not significant. Moreover, it is possible to
delegate the encryption and decryption to the mobile equip-
ment, instead of executing them on the USIM. This would
not weaken the security properties of the 3G procedure, since
the mobile equipment in the current architecture has already
access to the IMSI, while the network public key is publicly
available information.
For roaming purposes, each Home Network (HN) can act
as certifying authority of the Serving Network (SN) for its
own subscribers. The public key pbHN of the HN could be
stored in the USIM. At registration time with a SN, the MS
would declare its HN, and the SN would provide the MS
with its public key pbSN , together with a certificate from
the mobile station’s HN (signskHN (pbSN)). Hence, a mobile
station would only need to obtain a certified version of the
SN’s public key, and verify it using its own network provider
public key. This would provide, in a efficient way, the MS
with the necessary public keys to execute our fixed versions
of the protocols.
The introduction of cryptographic operations on the mo-
bile equipment side could be a source of Denial of Service
(DoS) attacks aiming to consume the battery load of victim
mobile phones. To mitigate the effect of such attacks, the
mobile phone’s software could rate limit the phone’s willing-
ness to respond to authentication, IMSI paging and identity
request messages, so to guarantee a minimum battery life-
time even in case of attempted DoS attacks. We have calcu-
lated that responding to such requests on average once per
minute would consume an additional one tenth of battery
life.
6. VERIFICATION
Many deployed protocols have subsequently been found
to be flawed [27, 18, 12, 16]. In this perspective and in
order to increase the confidence one can have in the solutions
proposed at the previous section, we formally analyse our
proposed fixes w.r.t. privacy. We present the results of the
automatic verification of the privacy-friendly enhancement
discussed in Section 5. Table 1 summarises these results
which apply for the protocols running both in parallel and
in isolation. We use the ProVerif tool [15] to verify the
unlinkability and anonymity properties of our fixes for the
3G procedures exposing the IMSI (identification and paging)
and the 3G AKA protocol. We use the formalisation of
privacy-related properties as given by Arapinis et al. in [11],
namely strong unlinkability and strong anonymity.
Note that for verification purposes we use randomised
symmetric encryption to conceal the sequence number SQN
instead of using the exclusive-or. Indeed, even if the theory
allows to write a set of reduction rules to model the xor
function, the ProVerif tool cannot deal with its algebraic
properties. The use of randomised encryption anyway would
achieve stronger properties with respect to the secrecy of the
sequence number, we hence recommend the adoption of this
modification in the standard protocol.
6.1 ProVerif Calculus
We use the ProVerif calculus, which is similar to the
applied pi-calculus [9], to precisely model the privacy en-
hancing solutions proposed in Section 5. It makes it possi-
ble to automatically verify protocol models written in the
language, using the ProVerif tool [15]. We introduce the
ProVerif calculus aiming to give a flavour of the verifica-
tion process. The description of the calculus that we give
here is not comprehensive (refer to [15] for a detailed pre-
sentation).
Cryptographic primitives are modelled as functions and
messages are represented by terms built over an infinite set
of names a, b, c, . . . , an infinite set of variables x, y, z, . . . and
a finite set of function symbols f1 . . . , fn. Function symbols
represent cryptographic primitives that can be applied to
messages. The effect of applying function symbols to terms
is described by a set of reduction rules.
Example 1. Using functions and reduction rules we can
define cryptographic functions, for example, let Σ={senc/3,
pub/1, aenc/3, f/2, f1/2, f2/2, f3/2, f4/2, f5/2},
and consider the reductions: reduc sdec(k, senc(k, m, r)) =
m and reduc adec(k, aenc(pub(k), m, r)) = m. Where, senc
and aenc model, respectively, randomised symmetric and
asymmetric encryption and model the property that the
plaintext, m, can be retrieved from the cyphertext given
the knowledge of the key k.
The syntax of ProVerif calculus processes is given by
the following grammar:
P, Q, R ::= plain processes
0 null process
P | Q parallel composition
!P replication
new n; P name restriction
if M = N then P else Q conditional
let M = D in P else Q destructor application
in(M, x); P message input
out(M, N); P message output
We give here only the informal semantics of the calculus.
The null process does nothing. P | Q represents the parallel
execution of P and Q. The replication !P of a process P
acts like the parallel execution of an unbounded number of
copies of P . The name restriction new n; P creates a new
name n whose scope is restricted to the process P and then
runs P . The message input in(M, x); P represents a process
ready to input from the channel M . The message output
out(M, N); P describes a process that sends a term N on the
channel M and then behaves like P . The let construct tries
to rewrite D and matches the result with M ; if this succeeds,
then the variables in M are instantiated accordingly and P
is executed; otherwise Q is executed. The conditional checks
the equality of two terms M and N and then behaves as P
or Q accordingly. We will omit the else branch of a let or a
conditional when the process Q is 0.
Example 2. Multiple mobile stations MS, with identity
imsi, and long-term private key sk running along with the
serving network, SN , can be modelled by the process:
S = new pvN ; let pbN = pub(pvN) in
out(c, pbN); !new sk; new imsi; !new sqn; (SN | MS).
The privacy related properties we verify are expressed
in terms of observational equivalence. Intuitively, two pro-
cesses P and Q are observationally equivalent denoted by
P ≈ Q, if any interaction of P with the adversary, can be
matched with an interaction of Q (and vice versa, i.e. all
interactions of Q can be matched by P ) and the same in-
put/output behaviour is observed.
The ProVerif tool can prove diff-equivalence of bipro-
cesses, which implies observational equivalence. Biprocesses
are pairs of processes which differ by some choice of terms,
this choice is written choice[M, M ′]. For example, to test
if the processes out(c, a) and out(c,b) are equivalent,
one would check the following biprocess using ProVerif:
out(c, choice[a, b]).
6.2 Strong Unlinkability
Strong unlinkability is defined in [11] as follows. Let
P = new n˜.(!R1 | · · · |!Rp) be a p-party protocol where
∀i ∈ {1, . . . , p}, Ri = new id.new m˜.initi.!(new s.maini).
For all i ∈ {1, . . . , p}, we build the protocol P Ri as follows:
P Ri = new n˜.(!R1 | · · · |!Ri−1 |!R′′i |!Ri+1 | · · · |!Rp)
R′′i = new id.new m˜.initi.new s.maini.
P is said to preserve strong unlinkability of Ri if P ≈ P Ri.
Informally, this means that the adversary cannot distinguish
a situation where the role Ri was executed many times from
one in which it was executed at most once, i.e. he cannot
link two executions of the role Ri. Going back to our mobile
phone scenario, the strong unlinkability property holds when
the situation where mobile stations access services multiple
times looks the same as the ideal situation where each mo-
bile station accesses the services at most once, i.e. where
by construction unlinkability holds. Formally, we want the
process S, defined in Example 2, to be observationally equiv-
alent to the system SUNLINK defined as follows:
SUNLINK = new pvN ; let pbN = pub(pvN) in
out(c, pbN);
!new sk; new imsi; new sqn; (SN | MS).
The absence of the replication before the new sqn construct
means that in SUNLINK each MS executes the protocol at
most once. The above mentioned observational equivalence
can be verified with ProVerif, defining S and SUNLINK as
the following biprocess PVUNLINK , where sk1, sk2 are long
term keys and imsi1, imsi2 are long term identities:
PVUNLINK = new pvN ; let pbN = pub(pvN) in
out(c, pbN);
!new sk1; new imsi1;
!new sk2; new imsi2; new sqn;
let (sk, imsi)=choice[(sk1, imsi1),(sk2, imsi2)]
in (SN | MS).
We have that the left side of the choice represents a sys-
tem where a mobile station (with identity imsi1 and key
sk1) may execute the protocol many times, while the right
side represents a system where mobile stations execute the
protocol at most once (the identity imsi2 and the key sk2
are always different and can be used at most once for the
execution of the protocol). Hence, we reduce the problem of
testing strong unlinkability to the diff-equivalence of a bipro-
cess. ProVerif proves that the strong unlinkability property
is satisfied by our models of the fixes identification, paging
and AKA protocols as described in Section 5.
6.3 Strong Anonymity
Strong Anonymity is defined in [11] as follows. Let P =
new n˜.(!R1 | · · · |!Rp) be a p-party protocol where ∀ i ∈
{1, . . . , p}, Ri = new id.new m˜.initi.!(new s.maini). For all
i ∈ {1, . . . , p}, we build the protocol P Ri as follows:
P Ri = new n˜.(!R1 | · · · |!Rp | RV )
RV = new m˜.initi{idV /id}.!(new s.maini{idV /id}).
Where the identity idV of the agent playing the role RV
is a public name not occurring in P . P is said to preserve
strong unlinkability of Ri if P ≈ P Ri. Informally, this means
that the adversary cannot distinguish a situation where the
role RV with known identity idV was executed from one in
which it was not executed at all, i.e. he cannot breach the
anonymity of the agent with role RV . Going back to our
mobile phone scenario, strong anonymity requires a system
in which a mobile station MSV with publicly known identity
IMSI V executes the protocol to be indistinguishable from a
system in which the MSV is not present at all. Such a system
obviously preserves IMSI V ’s anonymity. Formally, we want
the system S, defined as in Example 2 to be observationally
equivalent to the system SV defined as follows:
SV = new pvN ; let pbN = pub(pvN) in
out(c, pbN);
!new sk; new imsi; (!new sqn; (SN | MS))
| new sk; !new sqn; (SN | MSV ).
In the system SV the mobile station MSV with publicly known
identity imsiV can run the protocol. The mentioned ob-
servational equivalence can be translated in the following
ProVerif biprocess PVANON , where imsiV , imsims are per-
manent mobile station identities:
free imsiV .
PVANON = new pvN ; let pbN = pub(pvN) in
out(c, pbN);
(!new sk; new imsi;
(!new sqn; (MS | SN)))
| (new sk; new imsims;
let imsi=choice[imsiV , imsims] in
!new sqn; (SN | MS)).
The left side of the choice represents a system where the mo-
bile station with public identity imsiV can run the protocol.
Our fixes of the identification procedure, paging procedure
and AKA protocol as described in Section 5 are proved by
ProVerif to satisfy anonymity.
We took particular care in avoiding false attacks that
could be reported by the tool due to its abstractions. Indeed,
we formally define privacy properties through observational
equivalence, however, ProVerif adopts a stronger equiv-
alence relation called diff-equivalence. In particular, diff-
equivalence can distinguish between the execution of differ-
ent branches of a conditional statement even in the following
case: if a = a then P else P ≈diff/ if a = b then P else P
Properties Identification Paging AKA
Unlinkability
√ √ √
Anonymity
√ √ √
NA Not Applicable
√
Proved to hold × Attack found
Table 1: ProVerif Results on the Fixed Procedures
Properties Paging AKA
Unlinkability × ×
Anonymity × √
NA Not Applicable
√
Proved to hold × Attack found
Table 2: ProVerif Results on the current 3G Procedures
and hence, although the above processes are observation-
ally equivalent (P is executed regardless the result of the if
statement evaluation), they do not satisfy diff-equivalence.
We are dealing with this issue in our code for the verifica-
tion at lines 4-5, 36, 73-74, 81, and 86-87 of the code in the
Appendix. As expected, the verification with the ProVerif
tool fails to prove the anonymity of the 3G IMSI paging
procedure and the unlinkability of both 3G IMSI paging
and AKA protocols (see Table 2) and finds counterexamples
showing that the two systems are distinguishable by the ad-
versary. The modelling of unlinkability and anonymity into
diff-equivalences we showed in this Section can in general be
adopted for protocols which do not require an initialization
phase preceding the main protocol procedure. Hence, our
method is not specific for the analysed protocols, and shows
how to automatically verify unlinkability and anonymity on
a wide class of protocols2.
7. CONCLUSION
The widely-deployed 3GPP 3G protocols aim to prevent
unauthorised parties (such as private organisations and in-
dividuals) from tracking the physical location of users by
monitoring the signals from their mobile phone. Specifically,
the protocols use temporary identifiers and cryptography to
achieve this aim.
We have shown that the protocols are vulnerable to new
privacy threats and that these threats lead to attacks that
can be mounted in practice at low cost. Currently, our
demonstration relies on particular hardware/software using
closed source implementation of the 3G protocol stack and
radio signalling functions. We tested several networks of
major operators (T-Mobile, O2, SFR, and Vodafone) and
demonstrated that these are vulnerable to our attacks.
We used formal methods to show that the exposed pri-
vacy vulnerabilities could have been detected at design time,
We developed and verified lightweight solutions to avoid the
privacy vulnerabilities. The solutions we propose show that
privacy friendly measures could be adopted by the next gen-
eration of mobile telephony standards while keeping low the
computational and economical cost of implementing them.
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9. APPENDIX
Authentication, Secrecy, Integrity. The main purpose
of the AKA protocol is to provide mutual authentication and
establish session keys to be used for integrity protection and
secrecy. Hence, our analysis would not be complete without
ensuring that our privacy preserving version of the 3G AKA
protocol still achieves the goals it was originally designed
for. We verify mutual authentication and integrity proper-
ties as injective correspondence properties. We prove using
ProVerif that the original properties of the AKA protocol
are preserved by our fixes; the verification results are shown
in Table 3.
Properties Identification Paging AKA
Secrecy
IMSI
√ √ √
KIMSI NA
√ √
CK, IK NA NA
√
confidential
information
NA NA
√
Authentication NA NA
√
Integrity NA NA
√
NA Not Applicable
√
Proved to hold × Attack found
Table 3: Results of the Automatic Verification of the
Fixed Procedures
ProVerif code We report the most relevant parts of
the ProVerif scripts used for the verification of the fixed
protocols. We omit the declaration of constants, any name
which is not under the scope of a new statement as public
name and hence as part of the adversary knowledge. Note
that the identity of the victim mobile for the anonymity
property is public.
Fixed IMSI paging procedure in ProVerif.
1 let PAGING_MS = in(c, x);
2 let (msgtype, xrand, xblob) = x in (
3 if msgtype = pagingReq then (
4 let (xpage, ximsi, =sqn, xchall) =
5 sdec(f(k, xrand), xblob) in (
6 if xpage = page then (
7 if imsi = ximsi then (
8 out(c, (pagingResp, xchall))))))).
9 let PAGING_SN = new rand; new chall;
10 new r_sn1; new r_sn2;
11 let UK = f(k, rand) in (
12 out(c, (pagingReq, rand, senc(UK, r_sn2,
13 (page, imsi, sqn, chall))));
14 in(c, pres)).
Biprocess for unlinkability of IMSI paging.
15 process new pvN; let pbN = pub(pvN) in (
16 out(c, pbN);
17 (! (new sk1; new imsi1; new otmsi1;
18 (! (new sk2; new imsi2; new otmsi2; new sqn;
19 let imsi = choice[imsi1, imsi2] in (
20 let k = choice[sk1, sk2] in (
21 let otmsi = choice[otmsi1, otmsi2] in (
22 (PAGING_MS) | (PAGING_SN)))))))))
Biprocess for anonymity of IMSI paging.
23 process new pvN; let pbN = pub(pvN) in (
24 out(c, pbN);
25 ((! (new k; new imsi; new otmsi;
26 (! ((PAGING_MS) | (PAGING_SN)))))
27 | (new k; new id; new otmsi;
28 let imsi = choice[id, imsi_V] in
29 (! ((PAGING_MS) | (PAGING_SN)))))
Fixed AKA procedure in ProVerif.
30 let AKA_MS = new r_ms; in(c, x);
31 let (xrand, xautn) = x in (
32 let (msg, xmac) = xautn in (
33 let ak = f5(k, xrand) in (
34 let xsqn = sdec(ak, msg) in (
35 let mac = f1(k, (xrand, xsqn)) in (
36 if (xmac, xsqn) = (mac, osqn) then (
37 let res = f2(k, xrand) in (
38 let ck = f3(k, xrand) in (
39 let ik = f4(k, xrand) in (
40 out(c, res);
41 in(c, xmsg)))))
42 else (out(c, aenc(pbN, r_ms,
43 (Fail, imsi, osqn))))))))).
44 let AKA_SN =
45 new rand; new r_sn; new s; new r;
46 let mac = f1(k, (rand, osqn)) in (
47 let res = f2(k, rand) in (
48 let ck = f3(k, rand) in (
49 let ik = f4(k, rand) in (
50 let ak = f5(k, rand) in (
51 let autn = (senc(ak, r_sn, osqn), mac) in (
52 let av = (rand, res, ck, ik, ak) in (
53 out(c, (rand, autn));
54 in(c, xres);
55 if xres = res then (
56 out(c, senc(ck, r, s)))
57 else (out(c, reject))))))))).
Biprocess for unlinkability of AKA.
58 process new pvN; let pbN = pub(pvN) in (
59 out(c, pbN);
60 (! (new sk1; new imsi1;new otmsi1;
61 (! (new sk2; new imsi2; new osqn; new otmsi2;
62 let imsi = choice[imsi1, imsi2] in (
63 let k = choice[sk1, sk2] in (
64 let otmsi = choice[otmsi1,otmsi2] in (
65 (AKA_MS) | (AKA_SN)))))))))
Biprocess for anonymity of AKA.
66 process new pvN; let pbN = pub(pvN) in (
67 out(c, pbN);
68 ((! (new k; new imsi; new otmsi;
69 (!new osqn; ((AKA_MS) | (AKA_SN)))))
70 | (new k; new id; new otmsi;
71 let imsi = choice[id, imsi_V] in (
72 !new osqn; ((AKA_MS) | (AKA_SN))))))
Original AKA procedure in ProVerif. We check the
MAC and the sequence number (line 81) in the same condi-
tional statement, so to avoid false attacks due to the evalu-
ation of the conditional. For the same reason we introduce
the functions err and geterr (lines 73-74) to determine the
error message (lines 86-87) and avoid the use of an if state-
ment.
73 reduc geterr(err(x,z,y,y))=macFail;
74 geterr(err(x,x,y,z))=synchFail.
75 let AKA_MS = new r_ms; in(c, x);
76 let (xrand, xautn) = x in (
77 let (msg, xmac) = xautn in (
78 let ak = f5(k, xrand) in (
79 let xsqn = sdec(ak, msg) in (
80 let mac = f1(k, (xrand, xsqn)) in (
81 if (xmac, xsqn) = (mac,sqn) then (
82 let res = f2(k, xrand) in (
83 let ck = f3(k, xrand) in (
84 let ik = f4(k, xrand) in (
85 out(c, res); in(c, xmsg)))))
86 else (let err_msg =
87 geterr(err(mac, xmac, sqn, xsqn)) in
88 out(c, err_msg))))))).
